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Social Conflict: Some Basic Principles
Dean G. Pruitt*
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "conflict" has two generally accepted meanings.' The first refers to
overt conflict-an argument, fight, or struggle. The second refers to subjective
conflict-Party's perception that Party and Other have opposing beliefs or inter-
ests, or that Other has deprived or annoyed Party in some way. The latter concept
is richer for theory building than the former, in that there are several strategies
Party can employ in reaction to subjective conflict. Party can take a contentious
approach and retaliate, or Party can try to impose its will on Other by means of an
argument, demand, or threat. This strategy is very likely to lead to overt conflict.
Instead of contending, Party can remain inactive or yield to Other, or Party can
engage in problem solving, with the aim of finding a solution to the conflict that
both of them can accept. One sometimes finds combinations of these strategies.
Contentious behavior, and hence overt conflict, is often unfairly maligned.
When enacted in moderation, it has several positive virtues. It can discourage
premature group decision making, as when Party defends its views until there has
been full discussion of the issues. Conflict can facilitate a reconciliation of peo-
ple's legitimate interests, as when Party insists on what it finds important until
Other is convinced or they have found a reasonable compromise. Indeed, without
moderate overt conflict-and the resulting persuasion or compromise-there can
be little progress in groups, organizations, and nations, and these entities may well
fall apart. Avoidance of moderate conflict can lead, in the long run, to dissolution
of a marriage or to civil war.
Conflict gets its bad reputation because overt conflict sometimes becomes too
severe; heavy threats or violence are employed. People or property get hurt, rela-
tionships deteriorate, and some participants lose their health because their immune
systems have been undermined. The problem in such cases is not conflict per se,
but the escalation of conflict.
IH. ESCALATION
Escalation occurs when a party to a conflict uses heavier contentious tactics
than before-demands in place of requests, angry statements in place of demands,
threats in place of angry statements. Escalation sequences are often found where a
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party becomes increasingly contentious over time.2 Escalation sequences are
sometimes unilateral, with Party doing all the escalating in response to persistent
annoyance from Other. For example, the chair of a meeting that has gone astray
might first suggest, "Let's get back to the topic," then demand, "Come on guys,
let's talk about the topic," and finally get angry and pound on the table. Most
escalation sequences are bilateral, though, with both sides escalating in tandem.
Bilateral escalation involves a conflict spiral, in which each side's escalation
is a response to the other's most recent escalation-in other words, a vicious circle
of blow and counterblow. An example of a conflict spiral follows.
Between 1978 and 1980 management and labor in a Kentucky coal mine op-
eration were having a dispute.3 During this two-year period the miners had en-
gaged in twenty-seven wildcat strikes. Management had responded by firing min-
ers and taking the union to court for breach of contract. In the end, 115 miners
had gone to jail for a night. This not only failed to stop the strikes, but led to a
wave of bomb threats, sabotage, and theft. Miners started bringing guns in their
cars when they came to work.
Each hostile action in a conflict spiral adds a new grievance to the other
side's list and makes the other side more hostile and punitive. This, in turn, pro-
vides a renewed basis for the first side's hostile action, and so on.
Most escalation sequences subside fairly quickly. Teachers go on strike and
there are many ill-willed feelings, but finally they negotiate and patch up the prob-
lem. Husband and wife yell at each other over expenditures, but they finally talk
it over and apologize. India and Pakistan posture at the border, but then the na-
tions send peace delegations. However, if conflict spirals go too far or too long,
escalation can become a semi-permanent affair, that is, an intractable conflict.
Examples include the Kentucky coal mine conflict previously described, the con-
flict between 1968 and 1998 in Northern Ireland, and the long-standing conflict
between Israel and the Palestinians.
What are the characteristics of conflicts that spiral out of control and become
intractable? Often they involve one-sided vision: Each side blames the other for
starting the conflict or for heating it up unduly. Each side sees itself in a unilateral
escalation situation in which Other is the perpetual "aggressor" and Party is sim-
ply defending itself. In other words, there is no understanding of the conflict spi-
ral, which means that there is no sense of responsibility to remedy it. An example
of one-sided vision is former President Reagan's reply to the question of whether
an arms race existed between the US and Russia: "There is no arms race; they are
racing and we are simply trying to keep up."
Another common occurrence on the road to intractable conflict is that struc-
tural changes take place on one or both sides or in the community surrounding
them. Structural changes are produced by escalation, and they keep escalation
going. Some structural changes are in the psychological realm. Hostile attitudes
and perceptions set in, trust breaks down, and new, more competitive goals de-
2. See Dean G. Pruitt, Conflict Escalation in Organizations, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFLICT
AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS (Carsten K. W. De Dreu & Michele J. Gelfand eds.,
2007).
3. WILLIAM URY, JEANNE M. BRETT, & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETrING DISPuTEs RESOLVED:
DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 101 (1988).
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velop. One is no longer simply motivated to succeed in the conflict; one wants "to
look better than, punish, discredit, defeat, or even destroy" the other party.
4
If groups are involved in escalation, changes may also occur in normative and
social structures within the groups. Hostile attitudes, perceptions, and goals often
become group norms, which are perpetuated by the processes of norm enforce-
ment. Furthermore, groups may become more mobilized as a reaction to contin-
ued conflict; it is often hard to put the genie back into the bottle once strong group
identities are formed, group grievances are crystallized, group leaders emerge,
and/or activist subgroups form. These structural changes frequently have func-
tions for the people involved-there are vested interests in maintaining them. As
a result, they tend to persist, keeping the conflict in a perpetually escalated state.
Structural changes may also occur in the community surrounding the parties.
When conflict heats up, formerly neutral community members are often pulled to
one or the other side of the controversy, a phenomenon known as "community
polarization., 5 The resulting social support reinforces both sides' sense of griev-
ance and hostility toward the other side, and can strengthen their capacity for ag-
gressive action, encouraging further escalation. It also erodes the ranks of neutrals
who might otherwise try to dampen the two sides' tactics and mediate the conflict.
The Cold War division of the world into supporters of the Soviet Union and of the
West is a good example of community polarization.
Under what conditions do such one-sided vision and structural changes take
place, leading to intractable conflict? Prejudice and bad initial relations between
the parties are sometimes to blame. Research shows that people in distressed
marriages are prone to retaliate when annoyed and, hence, are more likely to be-
come involved in conflict spirals than those in happy marriages.6 Groups are also
more prone to escalation than are individuals.7 When conflict is at the intergroup
level, preexisting community structure also makes a difference. Varshney's study
of conflict in Indian cities found that escalation was much diminished in commu-
nities with integrated civic organizations-political parties, unions, and business
associations-that had members from both sides of the tense Hindu-Muslim di-
vide.8 When Hindu-Muslim conflict arose, members of these crosscutting asso-




One cannot possibly do justice to the immense topic of conflict resolution in
this brief article, but an important aspect that is not well understood bears brief
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The author first encountered backchannel communication in some literature
he read about labor-management contract negotiation' 0 and some interviews he
did about NASA procurement negotiation." In the formal part of these negotia-
tions, one typically finds a team of people on each side of the table. Each team
has a laundry list of demands that are defended while the other team's laundry list
is refuted. It is common for deadlocks to occur in such negotiations. Both sides
want an agreement, but there is relatively little progress.
At this point, covert problem-solving often begins-informal, backchannel
talks, with the aim of locating a mutually acceptable compromise. The head nego-
tiators, or their deputies, have dinner together in an obscure restaurant or tele-
phone each other and work out a deal they can sell to their respective teams. The
key to success in such talks is that a small number of people are communicating
privately while the main negotiation is still going on.
Backchannel communication has two benevolent consequences: (1) Flexibil-
ity. The parties can talk about what is most important to each of them and brain-
storm about possible solutions to the problem without kibitzing from more hostile
teammates and without fear of undermining their official negotiation positions. If
the secret talks do not work, they can return to their official positions at the table
without serious loss. (2) Creativity. Quiet, informal settings like restaurants or
bars allow people to relax, which encourages the creative juices to flow. This may
be the key to developing new ideas for workable compromises.
Backchannel communication is especially important when the conflicting par-
ties are very hostile toward each other, as in intractable international conflicts and
conflicts between governments and rebel groups. In such cases, it is difficult to
start formal negotiation until there has been a lot of backchannel talk. This is
partly because backchannel communication allows the parties to talk while con-
tinuing to fight; usually neither side is willing to stop fighting until they are fairly
sure that an agreement can be reached. It is also partly because of the need for
political cover. When relations between conflicting parties are seriously eroded,
communication is often equated with disloyalty on both sides. Officials who are
caught communicating with the other side are likely to lose their jobs, or worse.
Hence, if they want to explore the feasibility of a negotiated settlement, they turn
to backchannel talks and keep them as secret as possible.
If backchannel talks are successful, it becomes much easier to enter formal
negotiation because there is reason to believe that the other side will make sub-
stantial concessions. This means that a ceasefire is feasible and political oppo-
nents are faced with a fait accompli. Without ihe political cover provided by
backchannel talks, most severe conflicts would never be solved.
An example can be seen in the run-up to the 1998 negotiations that ended the
thirty-year Northern Ireland conflict. 12 By the late 1980s it had become obvious
to the two main players, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British gov-
10. See, e.g., EDWARD PETERS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 159-60 (1955);
RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS
174 (1965).
11. Dean G. Pruitt, Indirect Communication and the Search for Agreement in Negotiation, I J. OF
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 223, 225 (1971).
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ernment, that victory could not be achieved on the battlefield. This led to back-
channel talks, over a ten-year period, which culminated in the official negotia-
tions. The problem of political cover was so great that the IRA and the British
government communicated through chains of intermediaries rather than directly.
Take, for example, this chain of communication: Sinn Fein (the political wing of
the IRA) talked with the SDLP (a moderate, Catholic political party), which then
talked with the government of the Irish Republic, which then talked with the Brit-
ish government. Such chains enhance secrecy by making it difficult for reporters
to trace the communications and also improve communication by ensuring that
each party in the chain is talking with people who understand, and to some extent
sympathize, with what they are saying.13
Communication through these chains was so successful that each side became
convinced that the other side wanted to end the conflict, that the form of the final
negotiation was worked out, and that some preliminary agreements on substantive
issues were developed. Finally, the two sides felt confident enough to declare a
ceasefire and begin direct negotiations, into which the British brought representa-
tives of the Protestant Northern Ireland community.
The Northern Ireland talks provide a possible model for moving toward nego-
tiation with other ethno-nationalist terrorist groups, such as Hamas.14
IV. CONCLUSIONS: RELEVANCE TO THE MEDIA
Most people have a rather narrow model of escalated conflict, looking for the
aggressor and the defender-the villain and the angel.' 5 The media often are ef-
fective at challenging this perspective by presenting both sides of a conflict story.
However, further sophistication could be built into reader perspectives by noting
that conflict spirals are often at work in overt conflict and that one-sided vision
and structural changes often keep these spirals going.
Popular understanding of conflict resolution also appears to be rather primi-
tive. Take, for example, mediation-third-party assistance to people and groups
who are trying to solve a conflict. Sophistication about this topic is certainly
growing, as more contracts entail a mediation clause and more courts are offering
mediation in civil cases. But many people still confuse mediation and arbitration,
and few people voluntarily seek mediation when they are having a conflict.
16
Feature articles on community mediation centers and more attention to the role of
mediators in solving particular conflicts would help the public better understand
this important third-party service.
Reports on backchannel talks are seldom seen in the media, though these talks
often play a big role in conflict resolution and should also be an element of popu-
13. Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation Between Organizations: A Branching Chain Model, 10
NEGOTIATION J. 217, 222 (1994); Dean G. Pruitt, Escalation, Readiness for Negotiation, and Third-
Party Functions, in ESCALATION AND NEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 256-57 (I. Wil-
aiam Zartman & Guy Olivier Faure eds., 2005).
14. Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation with Terrorists, 11 INT'L NEGOTIATION 370-94 (2006).
15. PRUrr & KIM, supra note 1, at 93.
16. In a survey we did 15 years ago, only 2% of undergraduates reported seeking anything like
mediation when they were having a conflict. Mark E. Keating, Dean G. Pruitt, Rachel A. Eberle, &
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lar understanding. However, there is an ethical issue present. Reporters who
learn about ongoing secret talks (including secret mediation sessions) should not
write stories about them, even if there is danger of being scooped. The reason for
this is that publicity is likely to halt such talks and to discredit the leaders involved
in them, thus prolonging the conflict and making it more likely to escalate or to
stay escalated.
A case in point is a 1993 newspaper story written by an Irish journalist after
considerable research, which revealed the existence of a secret channel of com-
munication between Sinn Fein and British Intelligence through a mysterious in-
termediary called the "contact." 17 The story was highly embarrassing to the Brit-
ish government, which issued a phony explanation for the contact that enraged
Sinn Fein. As a result, the channel of communication was closed down. Had
there not been an additional channel through the SDLP and the Irish government,
this might well have set back the peace process. The journalist was surely behav-
ing as reporters are supposed to-investigating and then publishing an important
story-but the incident still poses an ethical issue. Secret talks that are moving
toward settlement of a severe conflict should only be reported after they have
occurred.
In short, conflict theory has much to offer to the mass media.
17. EAMONN MALLIE & DAVID MCKnTRICK, THE FIGHT FOR PEACE: THE SECRET STORY BEHIND
THE IRISH PEACE PROCESS 232-55 (1996).
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